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THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CULT MEMBER
PARENTS: RESOLUTION OF A CONFLICT
I. INTRODUCTION
Child custody determinations are arguably the most difficult
task to face the judiciary.' A jurist, in an attempt to vindicate
"the best interest of the child,"2 though accorded great discre-
tion, s must not only be cognitive of and sensitive to the child's
interests, but the parents' interests as well.' Deciding precisely
what a child's best interests are, "often eludes understanding."'
1. Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326, 330 (Mo. 1978). See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD &
A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) [hereinafter J. GOLDSTEIN];
Musetto, Standards for Deciding Contested Child Custody, J. OF CLINICAL CHILD PSY-
CHOLOGY, (1981), reprinted in CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 431-445 (G.E. Stollak & M.G.
Lieberman ed. 1985) [hereinafter Musetto].
2. "The paramount consideration in child custody disputes is the 'best interest of the
child.'" Note, Religion and Child Custody Disputes, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1702 (1984) [here-
inafter Child Custody]. A multitude of custody decisions recite this maxim. See, e.g.,
Waites, 567 S.W.2d at 331; In re Marriage of Short, 675 P.2d 323, 325 (Col. Ct. App.
1983); Burnham v. Burnham, 208 Neb. 498, 501, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61 (1981).
3. Child Custody, supra note 2. See generally Karst, The Nature of Intimate Associ-
ation, 89 YALE L. J. 624 (1980) [hereinafter Karst).
4. A custody dispute resulting in an award to one particular parent (not all disputes
end this way, however, see Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981) (where the
court awarded joint custody of the child); Birch v. Birch, 11 Ohio St. 3d 85, 463 N.E.2d
1254 (1984) (where the court awarded custody of the child to the state due to the appar-
ent unfitness of both parents) necessarily entails inhibiting the noncustodian's ability to
enjoy the love and companionship of his child, Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190, 193, 367
P.2d 230, 233 (1961), and to raise his child as he sees fit. See Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188,
324 N.Y.S.2d 71, 272 N.E.2d 567 (1971). Though it is generally within the discretion of
the parent to decide the manner by which to raise and educate his child, Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), this
general proposition is upheld by courts only in the event that no abuse or neglect is
employed. 29 N.Y.2d at 191-92, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 74-5, 272 N.E.2d at 570-71.
5. Musetto, supra note 1, at 431. The court's role in child custody determinations
falls within the rubric of parens patriae, literally, "parent of the country." This concept
originates from the English common law where the king had the prerogative to act as
guardian to persons such as infants and the psychologically impaired. In the United
States, parens patriae refers to the traditional "role of the state as sovereign and guard-
ian of persons under legal disability." West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079,
1089 (2d Cir. 1971),
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Certain statutes6 and judicial decisions7 do, however, offer guide-
lines by which to fashion custody orders.
In no instance is a custody decision more critical and prob-
lematic8 than when it may serve to contravene an individual's
fundamental rights" guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. This
note examines such a situation: when one prospective custodian
is a member of a cult. 10 Furthermore, the social and constitu-
tional considerations and ramifications involved when a judge
must accommodate the child's best interest and the cult mem-
ber's rights will be analyzed.
6. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has approved
and recommended the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act; § 402 provides:
The court shall determine custody in accord with the best interest of the child.
It shall consider all relevant factors including: . . . the interaction and interrela-
tionship of the child with his parents, siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interests; . . . and the mental and physical
health of all individuals involved. The court shall not consider conduct of the
proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child.
This model act has been adopted in many states. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212
(1983); COL. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1973); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375 (Supp. 1975); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 125.480 (1983).
7. Almost every custody decision proclaims, in one form or another, the need to pro-
tect from impairment the physical and psychological health and welfare of the child. See,
e.g., Clift v. Clift, 346 So. 2d 429, 435 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); In re Marriage of Hadeen, 27
Wash. App. 566, 571, 619 P.2d 374, 379 (Ct. App. 1980).
8. See supra notes 2, 6 & 7.
9. Those rights which are delineated in the express terms of the United States Con-
stitution, or that are necessarily implied by those terms, are deemed fundamental rights.
Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763 (1957). See generally Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. "The term 'cult' increasingly is applied to a disparate collection of groups and
movements, and consequently has become unsuitable as a precise legal . . . category."
Robbins, Religious Movements, The State, and The Law: Reconceptualizing the Cult
Problem, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. Soc. CHANGE 33 & n.1 (1979-80) [hereinafter Robbins].
"[C]ult" remains a "vague and unsatisfactory concept." Eister, Culture Crisis and New
Religious Movements: A Paradigmatic Statement of a Theory of Cults, in RELIGIOUS
MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 613 (Zaretsky & Leone ed. 1974).
The dictionary defines "cult" as: "worship; reverential honor [of] . . .. devoted at-
tachment to, or extravagant admiration for, a person, principle, etc. ... WEBSTER'S
NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 443 (2d ed. 1980). For the purposes
of this note, however, a precise formulation of the definition of a cult is unnecessary if
not unrealizable. Whether a particular group is accurately labeled a "cult" is unimpor-
tant. Whether a group so labeled engages in conduct which threatens the health and
welfare of a child is all important. The term will be employed here to refer to unconven-
tional religious, political, and psychotherapy groups which are often communal, authori-
tarian, and totalistic in nature. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 179 Cal. App. 3d 450, 457
n.12, 224 Cal. Rptr. 817, 828 n.12 (1986) (setting forth this general definition of a cult).
In short, "a cult is any group stigmatized as a cult." Robbins, supra.
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Although all courts agree that it is necessary and permissi-
ble to abridge a parent's religious" or associational' 2 freedoms
through a custody award when concomitant practices threaten
11. The first amendment of the Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CON-
STITUTION amend. I. This prohibition applies via the fourteenth amendment to the states,
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943), and includes judicial decisions as well as statutes. NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
The purposes of the two religion clauses, the establishment and free exercise clauses,
are distinct but related. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). "The
clause against the establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of sepa-
ration between church and state.'" Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983) (quot-
ing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)). The establishment clause serves to
ensure that no religious activity is sponsored, favored, or commanded by the state. Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). This clause requires that the state "'may not be
hostile . . . to the advocacy of no religion, and it may not aid, foster, or promote one
religion . . . against another.' " Child Custody, supra note 2, at 1703 n.6 (quoting Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968)).
The free exercise clause mandates that no state shall act in a manner which serves
to inhibit the exercise of an individual's religious beliefs merely because it disfavors a
particular denomination. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756; Cantwell, 330 U.S. at 296. In short,
"[g]overnment may not interfere with organized or individual expression of belief or dis-
belief." Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940). The Supreme
Court has asserted that the free exercise clause requires that an individual not be forced
to choose between adherence to her religious beliefs and secular law. Sherbert v. Werner,
374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
The Court has stated that it "repeatedly has recognized that tension inevi-
tably exists between the free exercise and establishment clauses . . . and that it
may often not be possible to promote the former without offending the latter. As
a result of this truism, our cases require the state to maintain an attitude of
neutrality, neither advancing or inhibiting religion."
See Child Custody, supra note 2, at 1702 n.2 (quoting 413 U.S. at 788).
12. The Court has long maintained that the first amendment carries with it a periph-
eral right: freedom of association. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Though this
right "is not expressly included in the first amendment, it is necessary in making the
express guarantees fully meaningful." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
The freedom to associate protects from governmental intrusion those associations that
are designed to facilitate express first amendment rights of religion and speech. Such
protected associations, however, are not limited to religious and political groups. Associa-
tions which accrue social, legal, or economic benefits to its members may be included as
well. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 452.
The Court has also recognized a freedom of intimate association. This associational
right protects from governmental intrusion "choices to enter into and maintain intimate
human relationships." The characteristics of such associations are "relative smallness, a
high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion
from others." 468 U.S. at 618, 620.
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impairment of a child's health or welfare,13 cult membership
poses uniquely complex questions in determining the existence
of physical or psychological harm to a child. From amidst emo-
tion and controversy, this note attempts to discern actual danger
from incrimination, fact from prejudice or stereotype, so that
clear standards may emerge to guide the courts in the endeavor
of constitutionally and socially responsible child placement.'
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A religious belief, as articulated by the Supreme Court, is
that belief "based . . . upon a power or being, upon faith, to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent."' 5 The Court has also stated that a religious belief is
one that " 'occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to
that filled by orthodox belief in God.' ,,i This definition is suffi-
ciently broad to encompass many cults.'7
The first amendment protects the holding of any religious
13. See supra notes 6-7.
14. For the purposes of this note, we shall assume that one potential custodian is a
member of a cult and the other may or may not be a member of a conventional group
not generally considered to be a cult; and that upon divorce or separation each parent
desires custody and is otherwise a fit parent.
15. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). Dr. Paul Tillich holds the es-
sence of religion is captured in the phrase "ultimate concern." P. TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF
FAITH 1-2 (1958). "One's views, be they orthodox or novel, on the deeper and more im-
ponderable questions-the meaning of life and death, man's role in the universe, the
proper moral code of right and wrong . . . are his ultimate concerns." Malnik v. Yogi,
592 F.2d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 1979). See generally Note, Toward a Constitutional Defini-
tion of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1056 (1978) [hereinafter Definition of Religion].
16. Pfeffer, Equal Protection for Unpopular Sects, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
9, 13 (1980-81)(quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166). See also United States
v. Welsh, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
17. See generally Definition of Religion, supra note 15. The religious cults include:
the Church of Scientology; the Children of God; the Unification Church; ISKCON (Hare
Krishna); the Divine Light Mission; the People's Temple; Love Israel; the Northeast
Kingdom Community Church; the River of Life Tabernacle; Black Hebrews of the Chil-
dren of Israel; and The Way International. See generally D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE,
STRANGE GODS: THE GREAT AMERICAN CULT SCARE (1981) [hereinafter D.G. BROMLEY &
A.D. SHUPE]; A.J. RUDIN & M. RUDIN, PRISON OR PARADISE: THE NEW RELIGIOUS CULTS 31-
97 (1980); C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL GODS CHILDREN (1977). This list is by no means
exhaustive as there have been reported to be "200-1,000 religious cults." Delgado, When
Religious Exercise Is Not Free: Deprogramming and the Constitutional Status of Coer-
cively Induced Belief, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1072 n.2 (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter
Deprogramming] (citing Lanier, America's Cults Gaining Ground Again, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, July 5, 1982, at 37, 39).
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belief no matter how unorthodox or bizarre it may appear to so-
ciety at large.18 Courts may not question the authenticity nor
weigh the merits of an individual's religious beliefs or doc-
trines.19 Moreover, the government, through its laws or courts, is
absolutely forbidden from interfering with an individual's reli-
gious belief merely because the religion is the object of public
derision. 0
The constitutional grant of associational freedoms, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court,21 is broad enough to include cer-
tain secular cults whether they be deemed "expressive ' 22 or "in-
timate'"23 association. The first amendment protects expressive
association against governmental intrusion based upon the con-
tent or subject matter of the political or social expression.2 The
government may not regulate such expression merely because
18. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1943); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 162-67 (1878); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.R.I.
1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-04 (1940)).
19. 322 U.S. at 86; Clift v. Clift, 346 So. 2d 429, 435 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
20. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04; Reynolds,
98 U.S. at 166. This applies to both the free exercise and the establishment of religion.
Governmental preference for a particular religion may interfere with religious belief of
another through intimidation.
21. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
22. "Expressive associations" include those groups which by design serve to bring
individuals together "in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educa-
tional, religious, and cultural ends." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-09, 923-33 (1982)); see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
244, 246 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978).
Cults which may be included in this group are the Political Cults: The National
Labor Federation; The New Alliance Party; The U.S. Labor Party; and the Symbionese
Liberation Army. See Deprogramming, supra note 17, at 1702 n.2.; Conason, Psycho-
politics: What Kind of Party is This Anyway?, Village Voice, June 1, 1982, at 1; Labor
Group: Saga of a Cult, East Hampton Star, Sept. 18, 1986 at 1. Also falling into the
category of expressive associations are the "Psychotherapy Cults": The Center For Feel-
ing Therapy and the Sullivanians to name just two. See Conason, Escape From Utopia,
Village Voice, Apr. 22, 1986, at 19, col. 1; Feeling Therapy: Dream Goes Sour, L.A.
Times, July 16, 1981, pt. V, at 1, col. 1.
23. The psychotherapy cults may also fall under the heading of "intimate associa-
tions." Though the Supreme Court definition of intimate association appears to be lim-
ited to those relationships within the context of one's family, such as marriage and child
rearing, arguably therapy cults and the concomitant patient-therapist relationships are
sufficiently small, selective, and seclusive to fulfill the definition of an intimate associa-
tion. See supra note 12. See generally Karst, supra note 3.
24. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (considering individual po-
litical and social expression).
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the message conveyed is unpopular or controversial.2 5 Although
the Supreme Court maintains that a "careful assessment" of the
nature of a particular "intimate" association is necessary to de-
termine whether it is to be accorded full first amendment pro-
tection against governmental regulation," this assessment
should not be premised upon prejudice or stereotype.
Freedom to practice one's religion or engage in expressive or
intimate association is not completely immune to governmental
restriction2 7 Although the beliefs of a religion and the expres-
sive ideas of an association are protected absolutely,2 the con-
duct or practices related to them are subject to infringement
through regulation adopted in pursuit of compelling public in-
terests. 29 Likewise, governmental action that serves to advance a
particular religious denomination may be justified only by com-
pelling public interests."
Thus, in the context of child custody disputes, the first
amendment prohibits the courts from designating a custodial
parent based upon an evaluation of the comparative merits of
his religious beliefs."1 This is, of course, the case regardless of
25. Id. at 115.
26. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
27. Pfeffer, supra note 16, at 15.
28. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
29. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The Court deter-
mined that a compelling public interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education
justified denial of tax-exempt status to the university although such denial would place a
burden upon the exercise of religious beliefs. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1943), where, in order to vindicate the compelling public interest of child safety, the
Court upheld a statute that criminalized the selling of religious newspapers by a child in
public despite the fact that the child believed it was her religious duty to engage in such
conduct.
This prescribed standard also provides that the governmental action fashioned to
vindicate a compelling public interest must be closely tailored to that end. That is, the
governmental action not only must pursue a compelling public interest, but also must do
so without undue infringement of rights protected by the Constitution. Bob Jones Uni-
versity, 461 U.S. at 604; Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Cantwell, 310 U.S.
at 303-04.
In the context of child custody determinations, however, it is unnecessary to address
the second prong of this test or standard because, as a practical matter, only one course
of action is presented to a court. In the event it finds that a potential custodian's reli-
gious or associational practices pose a threat to the physical or psychological health and
welfare of a child, a court may deny custody to that parent. Such judicial intervention is
ipso facto closely tailored or "least restrictive."
30. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1982).
31. Clift v. Clift, 346 So. 2d 429, 435 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
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the unpopularity or unconventionality of a prospective custo-
dian's religion. 2 Courts should likewise be forbidden from deter-
mining child placement based upon the intent to suppress or in-
hibit the expression of ideas or lifestyles connected with
protected associations.38 Because the state has a compelling in-
terest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being
of a minor,"8 " the first amendment does not prevent a court
from examining the religious or associational practices of pro-
spective custodians in order to determine whether such practices
entail harm or endangerment to the child's health or welfare. 5
Clear evidence indicating "a reasonable and substantial
likelihood of immediate or future impairment" of a child's phys-
ical or psychological welfare as a consequence of a prospective
custodian's religious or associational practices, justifies placing
the child with the other parent and serves to ameliorate any ap-
parent violation of first amendment proscriptions.3 6 If, however,
32. Harris v. Harris, 343 So. 2d 762, 764 (Miss. 1977). See Child Custody, supra note
2, at 1704 n.13 (citing Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REV.
333, 366 (1955)).
33. See Karst, supra note 3, at 656-59 (discussing generally the first amendment pro-
tection of intimate and expressive association and the expressive aspect of intimate
association).
34. Child Custody, supra note 2, at 1705 n.15 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 756-57 (1982); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
35. Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1030 (Me. 1980); Battaglia v. Battaglia, 9 Misc. 2d
1067, 1068, 172 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1958). "To hold that a court may not con-
sider religious factors under any circumstances would blind courts to important elements
bearing on the best interests of the child." Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1238
(Alaska 1979). Courts may also consider the content of one's association as well as one's
religious beliefs, but only so far as they are probative of practices. See Reimann v. Rei-
mann, 39 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (Sup. Ct. 1942), in which a New York supreme court denied
a prospective custodian custody of his child because "there was sufficient proof for the
court to find that he has been contaminated with the germ of Nazism." The court rea-
soned implicitly that such a finding would entail detriment to the child's welfare. See
also Child Custody, supra note 2, at 1705. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
110 (1972).
36. In re Marriage of Hadeen, 27 Wash. App. 566, 580, 619 P.2d 374, 382 (Ct. App.
1980). In Clift, however, the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama adopted a less stringent
rule which stated that in the event "the prospective custodian hold[s] views which might
reasonably be considered dangerous to the child's health," denial of custody to that par-
ent is justified. 346 So. 2d at 435.
In Osier, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine proclaimed that in order for a court
to be justified in awarding custody based upon consideration of a potential custodian's
religious practices, the same must "pose[] an immediate and substantial threat to the
child's well-being." 410 A.2d at 1030. And in Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 516
(Cal. App. 1967), the court of appeals adopted an "actual impairment" standard which
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a court merely recites adverse or potentially adverse effects
which might inure to a child and, in actuality, there exists no
substantial evidence to support such apprehensions, then suspi-
cions may be raised regarding the true motives of the court in
awarding custody as it did. Did the court act permissibly, in fur-
therance of a compelling public interest-child safety-or did it
act impermissibly, based upon mere approval or disapproval of a
prospective custodian's religion or association in contravention
of the first amendment?87
If the court does in fact cite as the basis of its placement
decision impairment of a child's physical or psychological health
and welfare due to the custodial parent's religious or associa-
tional practices, or asserts that it has based its determination
upon any such considerations, the order, on its face, does not
violate the first amendment. The placement of the child with a
religious parent may appear to promote one parent's religion
over the other's, and if the noncustodian is religious, inhibit his
free exercise of religion by dint of apparent judicial disapproval
thereof. Likewise, if the placement is with a nonreligious parent,
it may appear to restrict the free exercise of religion or freedom
of association of the noncustodian. Such "indirect" impact upon
first amendment freedoms does not, however, offend the
Constitution."8
required that manifest, present harm be evidenced in order to justify a denial of custody
founded upon parental religious practices.
It is the opinion of this writer that the standard enunciated in Hadeen, best fosters
an accommodation of the competing interests of the welfare of a child and the first
amendment rights of the parent. The rule set forth in Clift, appears not to afford suffi-
cient protection to a prospective custodian's religious freedom in that it may invite mere
speculation as to any potential danger inherent in particular religious tenets. The doc-
trines outlined in both Osier and Quiner, on the other hand, seem to inadequately safe-
guard a child's health and welfare in a situation which indicates a likelihood of future
harm though none is actually present or immediate.
37. Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190, 194, 367 P.2d 230, 233 (1961) (stating that "[a]judgment supported only by the tenuous threads of ...possible [detriment to a child]
derived from deviation in normal activities will not withstand the thrust of constitutional
guarantees").
38. The Supreme Court has on many occasions proclaimed that governmental action
which has only an incidental effect of either advancing or inhibiting religious activity is
not violative of the first amendment. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (both cases were decided in the context of the
establishment clause); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (the Court stated that so
long as the state is advancing a secular goal, "indirect burden on religious observance is
permissible unless the state may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose
[Vol. V
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The argument may be made, however, that any judicial ac-
tion that has the effect of curtailing an individual's right of free
exercise or association, no matter how incidental, stands in vio-
lation of the first amendment rubric.3 9
In the context of child custody disputes, however, only
those custody orders which are based upon an evaluation of the
potential for visitation of harm upon a child due to a parent's
religion or protected association can have the effect of impermis-
sibly abridging a prospective custodian's first amendment rights.
When custody is determined in this manner, an individual's reli-
gion or protected association may be designated as the reason
for the denial of custody. Only in this event is a parent justified
in viewing the decision as forcing him to choose between gaining
custody of his child and maintaining his affiliation with a reli-
gion or protected association.40 Only when harmful religious or
associational practices form the basis for denying a cult member
custody could it be possible for that parent to forego such prac-
tices and rationally hope to then be awarded custody of his
child. For if custody is determined in accordance with considera-
tions other than religion or association, altering one's beliefs
and/or practices should, of course, have no bearing upon the
such burden").
The Supreme Court has enunciated a three-prong test designed to evaluate laws and
judicial decisions which may be viewed as promoting a particular religion, or religion in
general. The test, first laid down in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), provides:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ...; finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" 403 U.S.
at 612-13. Although this test has long been the center of gravity of establishment clause
jurisprudence, it is "no more than [a] helpful signpost." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741 (1973). This is quite an apt characterization of the Lemon test, for its proscriptions
have scarcely served as an obstacle to the promotion of religion. In Mueller, the Court
was completely satisfied by the showing of any permissible secular purpose behind a
Minnesota statute granting a tax deduction to parents of children enrolled in private
schools, though 95% of such schools were sectarian institutions. The Court made no real
inquiry as to the existence of an impermissible religious purpose behind the statute. It
must be noted, the Lemon test and current establishment clause jurisprudence notwith-
standing, that scrutiny of legislative and judicial actions appearing to promote religion
should focus upon discerning the genuine intent behind such measures. Only if substan-
tial evidence exists to support a governmental entity's action as constitutionally permis-
sible, should an adverse impact upon certain protected rights be endured.
39. See Sherbert v. Werner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (the Court appeared to have
adopted this view, but in an apprehensive if not confused manner).
40. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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award. If, however, altering one's lifestyle in regard to religious
or associational practices does appear to have an effect on a cus-
tody order, then it becomes evident that a court is in fact basing
its determination upon an evaluation of a prospective custo-
dian's religion or association and it must, therefore, cite a com-
pelling public interest, i.e., protection of the child's health and
welfare, served by such action."' If no clear, substantial evidence
exists to support a custody order purportedly based upon con-
siderations other than religion or protected association, then
doubts may be raised regarding the court's true motives. The
less evidence that exists to support such determination by the
court, the more justified the noncustodian is in viewing the deci-
sion as demanding that an unconstitutional choice between cus-
tody and adherence to his religion or association be made.42 If,
however, it were not the case that only those custody orders
which are based upon consideration of a prospective custodian's
religion or protected association may be viewed as engendering
such a choice, any subjective reaction on the part of a cult-mem-
ber parent claiming violation of his first amendment rights pur-
suant to any custody decision would unnecessarily and unjustifi-
ably cast a shadow over the decision.
In the event that the judicial record presents no substantial
evidence upon which to support a custody award professed to be
founded upon considerations other than religion or protected as-
sociation, then suspicions may be raised as to whether the court
did, in.fact, make the decision free of an evaluation of a prospec-
tive custodian's religious or associational affiliation. In such a
case, when the court has failed to cite as the reason for its deter-
mination the religious or associational practices of a prospective
custodian, two extremely troubling scenarios arise: 1) where the
court has acted upon impermissible consideration of the merit of
a parent's religion or protected association; or 2) where the court
was apprehensive to cite the genuine reason for its decision, i.e.,
visitation of harm upon a child pursuant to religious or associa-
tion practices, for fear of being called upon to justify any appar-
ent contravention of first amendment doctrines.
The first scenario embodies an unconstitutional judicial act,
41. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
42. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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a court not citing the religion or protected association of a par-
ent as the basis for its determination because no harm to the
child was evident from testimony regarding concomitant prac-
tices and, therefore, the required compelling public interest did
not exist to justify placement away from a prospective custodian
based upon her religion or association. In other words, the court
based its directive upon disapproval of a particular religion or
association in clear contravention of the first amendment.43 The
first scenario may also translate into an unconstitutional judicial
act in that the court does not cite religion or protected associa-
tion as the reason for its order because it was endeavoring to
promote a particular religion, or religion in general, and no com-
pelling public interest existed to justify that apparent abridge-
ment of the establishment clause."
The second scenario embodies an unconstitutional judicial
act in that the court found that a parent's religious or associa-
tional practices endangered the health and welfare of the child,
justifying the court-ordered placement with the other parent
and any apparent infringement of the noncustodian's first
amendment freedoms, but avoided enunciation of this as the ba-
sis for its decision as is constitutionally mandated,45 in an effort
to eschew controversy. This scenario may also translate into an-
other unconstitutional judicial action: a court apparently disre-
garding findings of physical or psychological endangerment to
the child and placing the child with a religious parent in an at-
tempt to promote that religion, or religion in general, without
support of a compelling public interest to justify such action. In
fact, this version flies in the face of not only the establishment
clause and the compelling public interest of protecting against
impairment the health and welfare of the child, but also the par-
amount consideration of all custody determinations: the best in-
terest of the child."
To reiterate, a court that has founded its custody directive
upon an evaluation of a particular prospective custodian's reli-
gious or associational affiliation, or any practices concomitant
therewith, and is unable or simply chooses not to cite substantial
43. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 11, 12, 30 and accompanying text.
45. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 2, 6, 7, 11, 29-30, 34-35 and accompanying text.
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evidence of the likelihood of harm to a child's physical or psy-
chological well-being as the reason for placement away from
such parent, has abridged the noncustodial parent's right of free
exercise or association by impermissibly placing that parent in
the position of choosing between actively engaging in activity
protected by the first amendment and suffering the loss of cus-
tody of her child.
Although courts normally engage in ad hoc balancing of first
amendment rights and competing state interests,48 in a custody
dispute, once it has been established that a prospective custo-
dian's religious or associational practices may visit harm upon
his child, a judge has no choice but to place the child with the
other parent."9 A custody determination based upon genuine
concern for the child's health and welfare may not be challenged
through an attempt to vindicate a parent's constitutional rights.
This is so, provided that the court is able to cite substantial evi-
dence indicating actual or likely danger to the child. 0 The cen-
tral concern, therefore, becomes a court's ability to accurately
define that which is physically or psychologically harmful to a
child, and in what manner a parent's membership in a religious
or secular cult .may contribute to this danger."1
47. See, Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190, 193, 376 P.2d 230, 233 (1961); Gay Litigants
and Child Custody, 19 HARV. CR. - C.L.L. REv. 497, 523 (1984) (discussing this issue in
the context of protected association).
48. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-06 (1983); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
The drawback of balancing competing interests lies in the inevitable necessity for a
jurist to invoke his own personal values and in effect choose that which he deems more
important.
49. Almost every custody decision, at least implicitly, adopts this rule. See, e.g.,
Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1978); In re Marriage of Short, 675 P.2d 323 (Col.
Ct. App. 1983).
50. See Burnham v. Burnham, 208 Neb. 498, 502, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61 (1981).
51. As has been illustrated, courts disagree as to what constitutes harm from religious
or associational practices. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. See also infra
notes 181-197 and accompanying text.
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III. THE INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Due to her dependent status in society,52 a child requires a
"family" 53 to provide "on a continuing basis. . .an environment
which serves her numerous physical and mental needs. ' 54 This
view, which recognizes the child's needs as controlling in custody
disputes," serves society's interests as well. 6 The child of ade-
quate parents stands a better chance of becoming an adequate
parent herself in the future."
Although courts "disagree on the certainty and amount of
physical harm that must be shown" in order to justify denial of
custody, 8 the fact remains that recognition of physical harm in
general is not problematic. Courts have been slow, however, in
delineating a clear and concise strategy for recognizing what
constitutes the more complex danger of psychological injury to a
child. 9
The most critical elements of a child's psychological well-
being are that she is wanted" and that the child has an opportu-
nity to maintain "on a continuous basis a relationship with at
least one adult who is or will become [the child's] psychological
parent."6' Though the hallmark of a healthy "parent-child" rela-
tionship is the continuity of contact between the psychological
parent and child, this concept should not be viewed as so abso-
lute as to countenance the complete separation of the child from
52. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3. This phrase is indicative of the fact that society
views children as unable to be fully responsible for themselves or to determine and safe-
guard their best interests. Id.
53. "Family" refers to the "fundamental unit" responsible for the care of the child.
Id. at 13.
54. A child is "in need of direct, intimate, and continuous care by those who are
personally committed to assume such responsibility." Id. at 3. See infra note 162 and
accompanying text.
55. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra notes 1, at 7. See also supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying
text.
56. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 7.
57. Id.
58. Child Custody, supra note 2, at 1705 n.18.
59. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 4.
60. Id. at 98 (para. 10.2); See also Musetto, supra note 1 at 436, 443.
61. "A psychological parent is one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through
interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological
needs for a parent." J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 98 (para. 10.3); See Jordan v. Jordan,
302 Pa. Super. 421, 448 A.2d 1113 (Super. Ct. 1982).
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her other parent.62 An equally important element of a child's
psychological health is maintaining contact with the noncus-
todial parent."' In short, religious or associational practices that
mandate that a custodial parent forego the continuity of con-
tact64 with his child or sever all ties between his child and the
noncustodial parent, constitute psychological harm to the child
and justify denial of custody. 5
A more subtle element of a child's mental health is the ne-
cessity of permitting "the child to be a child in accord with his
or her age." ''  A prospective custodian's religious or associational
practices that do not allow a child to engage in natural, "age-
appropriate pursuits" impede her sound psychological develop-
ment and therefore justify denial of custody. 7
The final consideration involves the recognition of how im-
portant it is that the child be confident in the belief that her
custodian is "in charge and in control."" A child's secure psy-
chological existence must not be menaced by external forces that
threaten to breach the continuity of contact with her custo-
dian. 9 Any examination of the prospective custodian's religious
or associational practices must include a searching inquiry into
the possible existence of the conditions necessary for the child's
psychological well-being.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF CULTS
A. Overview
The literature regarding cults is replete with documentation
of physical and psychological abuse of children.70 Commentators
62. See Musetto, supra note 1, at 442.
63. See In re Marriage of Hadeen, 27 Wash. App. 566, 580-81, 619 P.2d 374, 382 (Ct.
App. 1980); Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 513-14 (Cal. App. 1967); Devita v.
Devita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 129, 366 A.2d 1350, 1355 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(Antell, J. dissenting).
64. This phrase refers to the relationship between a wanted child and psychological
parent. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
65. See Burnham v. Burnham, 208 Neb. 408, 304 N.W.2d 58 (1981); see also supra
notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
66. See Musetto, supra note 1, at 438.
67. Id.
68. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 116.
69. Id. at 118.
70. See infra notes 75-108 and accompanying text.
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have offered explanations for these practices including the total-
istic71 and authoritarian 72 nature of cults, as well as mind control
or brainwashing.73 This portion of the note, however, reviews
those practices that on their face pose danger to the physical
and mental health and well-being of a child and would thereby
justify denial of custody. For the purposes of this section, the
precise causality of the abusive practices is not of central con-
cern; what is critical is the mere existence of such practices in
conformity with religious or associational beliefs. 4
B. Physical Endangerment
The most harrowing documentation of child abuse relates to
the People's Temple.7 Reports tell of frequent and severe public
beatings with a heavy wooden paddle for such transgressions as
holding hands or stealing food.76 The now defunct People's
Temple is by no means the only cult to be accused of practicing
such abuse.7 One particular article describes fatal beatings of
children in three separate cults in accord with the teachings of
the group. 8
In addition to beatings, the brutal discipline of children in
certain cults includes torture. One cult practices torture by
71. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
74. The recitation of physically and psychologically harmful practices of particular
cults is merely meant to inform, not inflame, the reader. It is not the purpose of this note
to imply that all cults engage in such abusive practices as depicted below, but rather to
point up the fact that such unfortunate activity is a reality.
75. The People's Temple was a religious commune founded by the late Jim Jones. As
most readers will recall, it eventually established itself in the jungle of Guyana where, in
1978, Jones commanded his disciples to ingest poison-laced Kool-Aid. Approximately 300
of the over 900 dead were children. See F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING: AMERICA'S
EPIDEMIC OF SUDDEN PERSONALITY CHANGE (1979) [hereinafter SNAPPING]; Markowitz &
Halperin, Cults and Children: The Abuse of the Young, 1 CULTIC STUDIES J. 143, (Fall/
Winter 1984) [hereinafter Cults and Children].
76. See SNAPPING, supra note 75 at 237; W. APPEL, CULTS IN AMERICA: PROGRAMMED
FOR PARADISE 108 (1983) [hereinafter APPEL].
77. See Clapp, The Children of Cults, Christianity Today, March 4, 1983, at 61, col. 2
[hereinafter Clapp]; Landa, Hidden Terror: Child Abuse in Religious Sects and Cults,
Justice for Children, Fall, 1985, at 2 [hereinafter Landa]; Rudin, Cult Phenomenon: Fad
or Fact, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 17, 28 (1980-81) [hereinafter Cult
Phenomenon].
78. See Landa, supra note 77, at 4.
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electro-shock 7 9 and another by locking children in closets.8 0
Members of the People's Temple were reported to have engaged
in the practice of tying up children and leaving them overnight
in the jungle, and dropping them into deep wells where other
members would terrorize the child. 1
There exists a large store of reports of sexual abuse of chil-
dren in certain cults.82 Instances of rape,8" child sex, adult-child
sexual relations and incest84 have been described. 5 Such con-
duct is openly tolerated, if not encouraged, in some groups.8 6
Perhaps the most frustrating of all accounts of physical
abuse are those describing the denial of medical care to chil-
dren. Many reports depict the tragic scenes of children dying
due to treatable, if not curable, diseases and infections. 8 Certain
cults dispense with the use of physicians and hospitals and deny
children immunization from common childhood disease.89
Finally, certain cult doctrines and/or rituals result in depri-
vation of adequate sleep and/or dietary regimens.9
C. Psychological Endangerment9
The practices of many cults include the separation of chil-
dren from their biological parents.92 Children may be reared by
79. See SNAPPING, supra note 75, at 237 (describing the methods of the People's
Temple).
80. See Cult Phenomenon, supra note 77, at 28 (describing the Church of
Armageddon).
81. See W. APPEL, supra note 76, at 107-08. Punishment also included solitary con-
finement to cellars, rooms, and boxes resembling coffins. Cults and Children, supra note
75, at 148.
82. See Clapp, supra note 77, at 61, col. 3.
83. See Cult Phenomenon, supra note 77, at 28.
84. See Lands, supra note 77, at 4.
85. Though these abuses are categorized as "physical," one can well imagine the con-
comitant psychological injury visited upon the child.
86. Clapp, supra note 77, at 61, col. 3.
87. See HOUSE COMM. OF THE ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY (1985) (testimony of John G. Clark,
Jr.) [hereinafter House Report].
88. See Ostling, Matters of Faith and Death, TIME, Apr. 16, 1984, at 42; Indiana
Sect's Children Dying, Chicago Sun Times, Sept. 30, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
89. Landa, supra note 77, at 3.
90. See Cults and Children, supra note 75, at 146.
91. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
92. See Cults and Children, supra note 75, at 146; Pappo v. Hoy, Transcripts, Mar.
21, 1986, at 8 (Testimony of Miss Jody); Mar. 21, 1986, at 8 (Testimony of Mr. Putz);
Apr. 1, 1986, at 30 (Testimony of Miss Jody).
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other members of the group "or even geographically separated
from their parents."93 Parents and children may be prohibited
from forming meaningful relationships," or "parental absorption
within cult work may well make it difficult for parents to involve
themselves in rearing their children." 95 This separation of parent
and child effectively precludes the parent from fulfilling the
child's psychological needs of affection and nourishment.9 6 Thus
the parent cannot fulfill his role as psychological parent,97 and
the child will not feel wanted, knowing that his parent's alle-
giance is first and foremost to the cult. 8
Cult doctrine often requires that members dissociate from
the rest of society.9 This normally entails the complete separa-
tion of a child from a parent outside the group.100 Thus, a child
in the custody of a cult member may have no opportunity to
cultivate a meaningful relationship with the noncustodial
parent. 0 1
In many cults, psychological abuse takes the form of depriv-
ing children of their natural expression of sorrow, want and even
hunger. 102 This emotional deprivation may also include forbid-
ding children from entertaining fantasies'0 3 or engaging in psy-
chologically beneficial play experience.'04 In short, very often,
children of cults are not permitted to behave as any normal
93. Cult Phenomenon, supra note 77, at 28.
94. Id.
95. Cults and Children, supra note 75, at 146, 152.
96. Id. at 146.
97. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
98. This is clearly detrimental to the child's psychological well-being and, therefore,
justifies denial of custody to the cult member. See Burnham v. Burnham, 208 Neb. 498,
501, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61 (1981). A wanted child is one who receives affection and nourish-
ment on a continuing basis and who feels that he or she is and continues to be valued by
those who take care of him or her. See J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 98; Musetto, supra
note 1, at 436-37, 442-43.
99. See SNAPPING, supra note 75, at 155-58; W. APPEL, supra note 76, at 91.
100. See Cult Phenomenon, supra note 77, at 28.
101. In Devita v. Devita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 129-34, 366 A.2d 1350, 1355-57 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1976), Judge Antell issued a powerful dissent which implored the court to
adopt a rule that fostered the continuous relationship between the child and the noncus-
todial parent.
102. See Landa, supra note 77, at 2.
103. See Harrison, The Children and the Cult, NEw ENGLAND MONTHLY, Dec., 1984
at 58, col. 1.
104. See House Report, supra note 87, at 3.
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child would or should." 5 Such psychological deprivation is suffi-
cient in its own right to justify denial of custody to the cult
member engaging in such conduct. 0 6 The unfortunate truth is,
however, that cult members have been depicted as engaging in
physical abuse in order to deter the emotions and conduct of
children which they deem undesirable.1 07 This nexus of physical
and psychological abuse represents the most tragic of situations
involving the children of cults.10 8 When a cult member allows
another member to abuse his child, '09 or allows his allegiance to
the cult to upset his relationship with his child,1 the child can-
not be secure in the feeling that her parent is "in charge and in
control." ''
Although physical and psychological endangerment is not a
necessary consequence of cult affiliation, "the very character of
the cult organization and lifestyle provides significant predispos-
ing factors.""' The fundamental trait of a cult is the near abso-
lute control over the members' lives by the leadership."'
Through isolation and doctrine, cult members develop an appre-
hension, if not hostility, toward the outside world, which is
viewed as misguided and a threat to the group's very exis-
tence.1 The only way for the cult member to thrive, therefore,
is to adhere to the teachings of the cult. Members develop a
105. Musetto, supra note 1, at 438.
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107. See Landa, supra note 77, at 5.
108. Physical abuse in and of itself may result in an array of psychological disorders.
In no instance is psychological injury more damaging than when it is the product of
physical and psychological abuse. Children have no outlet for their intense emotions and
therefore turn them inward, transforming those feelings into contempt for themselves.
Id.
109. Often cult leaders will designate those who are to administer the abusive mea-
sures or undertake the task themselves. See Cults and Children, supra note 75, at 149.
110. See supra notes 61, 92-98 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
112. Cults and Children, supra note 75, at 145.
113. Id. at 147 (citing West & Singer, Cults, Quacks, and Non-professional Psycho-
therapists, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY III (Kaplan, Freedman, & Sadok
ed. 1980)). This control may be exerted by a single leader claiming divinity, and main-
tained by a hierarchical structure of leadership as is the case in most religious cults. See
D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra note 17, at 23-56. Control may also be exerted by a
single leader or group of leaders claiming to possess knowledge of the correct or enlight-
ened manner by which to conduct one's life, as is the case in many political and therapy
cults. See Labor Group, supra note 23.
114. See Cults and Children, supra note 75, at 148-49; APPEL, supra note 76, at 91.
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deep dependency upon the group and begin to welcome the
guidance that answers all questions regarding conduct and
thought.115 In the context of child endangerment, "the immen-
sity of the group's task makes questions of child abuse pall in
comparison." 116 Any perceived deviance from the cult's princi-
ples is viewed as deserving the harsh measures necessary to
maintain the group.1 7
D. Judicial Determination
A judge whose responsibility it is to determine whether to
place a child with a cult member must not allow his decision to
be premised upon mere rumor, accusation, prejudice, or stereo-
type regarding cults. By the same token, a judge, when con-
fronted with hard evidence of abusive practices as described
above, cannot risk passing it off as exaggerated. There is no
doubt that particular cults engage in perverse treatment of chil-
dren." 8 The onerous task remains-determination whether the
cult with which the prospective custodian is affiliated does, in
fact, practice such abuse.
The determination must be based upon hard evidence indi-
cating the credibility of all witnesses acquired through thorough
examination by party attorneys. The evidence not only must in-
dicate the existence of harmful practices, but also must reveal
that the cult member will allow himself or others to engage in
such practices." 9
A decision based upon the finding of abuse when such de-
terminations are questionable raises suspicions about the court's
motivation and may stand in violation of the Constitution. A de-
cision allegedly based upon considerations other than cult mem-
bership may raise similar concerns when the award of custody to
the non-cult member cannot be supported by the evidence
presented. Finally, a decision based upon considerations apart
from cult membership that places custody with the cult member
and flies in the face of evidence presented as to potential harm
to the child, risks contravening the paramount rule of all cus-
115. See Cults and Children, supra note 75, at 153.
116. Id.
117. Id. See also Cult Phenomenon, supra note 77, at 28.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 75-108.
119. See infra notes 126, 181-85 and accompanying text.
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tody disputes-placement in accord with the best interest of the
child.12 0 Placement in a potentially harmful environment is com-
pletely unjustifiable although it may serve to preserve the reli-
gious and associational freedoms of the cult member. 121
V. BRAINWASHING IN CULTS1 2 2
The discussion thus far has focused on manifest harm to the
physical and psychological health and well-being of the children
of cult members. 23 A more complex problem arises, however,
when there is substantial evidence to support a cult member's
testimony that although the group may engage in harmful prac-
tices, she herself does not, nor will she allow others to subject
her child to these practices."" Aside from the contention that
the cult member's testimony is not credible in general, 25 a judge
must be prepared to hear the argument that the cult member is
a victim of brainwashing and therefore is helpless to resist en-
gaging in abusive conduct in the future. 26 A similar problem
arises when no evidence exists indicating harmful practices by
the cult, but it is asserted that the cult member is the victim of
brainwashing and therefore should be denied custody in general.
It could be argued that some time in the future the cult may
dictate that abusive measures be employed and the custodian
would be powerless to resist. 2 7 It could also be argued that
brainwashing in and of itself renders a parent unfit because it
prevents her from fulfilling her role of psychological parent.
12
The term brainwashing was apparently coined in the early
1950s to explain the technique used by the North Koreans to
radically change belief and behavior in order to extract informa-
120. See supra notes 2, 6, 52-69 and accompanying text.
121. See Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1030 (Me. 1980).
122. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 75-90, 92-96, 98-108 and accompanying text; see also supra text
accompanying note 97.
124. It is, of course, obvious that few potential custodians will confess to employing
abusive measures or allowing others to do so. Our discussion thus far, however, has fo-
cused upon those situations in which substantial evidence indicates that the cult member
parent would engage or allow others to engage in abusive conduct toward her child.
125. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
126. For a general discussion of alleged brainwashing in cults, see Deprogramming,
supra note 17.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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tion from U.S. Servicemen during the Korean War.129 The most
widely recognized study of brainwashing is that of Robert Jay
Lifton, a psychiatrist. Lifton analyzed the technique as it was
employed by the Communist Chinese in the late 1940s.13 ° The
method entailed control of the surrounding environment includ-
ing: isolation; physical and emotional stress designed to destroy
the individual's senses of guilt and anxiety; and threats of death
and brutality followed by sudden reprieve or leniency.131
Whereas Lifton used a psychoanalytical model of brain-
washing,3 2 Edgar Schein employed a social-psychological model
to focus on the processes employed by the Communist Chinese
to alter beliefs.133
In accord with this general model of brainwashing, many
commentators assert that what distinguishes cults from other re-
ligions or protected associations is the use of brainwashing.'
Accounts by former cult members and observers describe such
methods as "stress, overwork, sleep deprivation, isolation from
the rest of society, and in some cases abuse or threats, . . . sen-
sory bombardment of various forms and inadequate diet, . . .
isolation from friends and family, . . . deprivation of privacy,
repetitious chanting and lectures, instillation of guilt, submis-
siveness, and dependency,"' 5 and, finally, "dispensing of exis-
tence."13 6 These techniques in various combinations are reported
to "produce an individual who has neither the opportunity nor
capacity to assess critically his or her engagement with the
[cult].' 3 7
129. See SNAPPING, supra note 75, at 99.
130. R. LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM: A STUDY OF
BRAINWASHING IN CHINA (1961).
131. Id. See also SNAPPING, supra note 75, at 100.
132. Lifton employed terms such as "ego-destruction" to describe the methods of the
communist Chinese. See R. LIProN, supra note 130.
133. E. SCHEIN, COERCIVE PERSUASION (1961). Though Schein's social-psychological
model focused upon the group processes employed, his findings were quite similar to
those of Lifton. See Deprogramming, supra note 17, at 1074 n.9.
134. See, e.g., Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion, 51 CA.
L. REV. 1 (1977); Labor Group, supra note 22.
135. Deprogramming, supra note 17, at 1080-81 (citations omitted).
136. Lifton, The Appeal of the Death Trip, N.Y. Times Magazine, Jan. 7, 1979, at
15, col. 1 (describing cult doctrine that holds that only those who follow the group's
teachings are "entitled to exist").
137. Deprogramming, supra note 17, at 1081.
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Though no doubt exists that certain cults employ these co-
ercive methods to one degree or another, numerous commenta-
tors maintain that actual brainwashing is both very rare and ex-
treme."8' These observers hold that those who claim that cults
brainwash their members make such accusations based not upon
informed or scientific scholarship, but rather upon popular jour-
nalistic, sociological and biased accounts of cult activity.1 39
Edgar Schein's own study of brainwashing reveals that
though highly successful in regard to obtaining "cooperation
done to avoid punishment or obtain amenities," actual ideologi-
cal conversion was extremely rare. 40 Research also indicates
that the voluntary turnover rate in most cults is quite high.""
One can only ask the question: if cults do brainwash their mem-
bers to the point of annihilation of the capacity for critical re-
flection, how is it that so many members leave of their own
volition?142
Actual brainwashing requires imprisonment and force, but
such elements are generally lacking in the methods of cults, 143
and for good reason. One is that they require great effort on the
part of those doing the brainwashing; 4 4 another is that they are
inefficient. 4  Even if cults had refined the technique to the point
138. See, e.g., D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra note 17, at 115; Panel Discussion:
Regulation of Alternate Religions By Law or Private Action: Can and Should We Regu-
late?, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 120 (1980-81) [hereinafter Regulation Panel];
Anthony, The Fact Pattern Behind the Deprogramming Controversy: An Analysis and
an Alternative, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 73, 79 (1980-81) [hereinafter Anthony];
Maleson, Dilemmas in the Evaluation and Management of Religious Cultists, 138 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 7 (1980).
139. See Anthony, supra note 138, at 79.
140. D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra note 17, at 99; on the order of 1%. "'[Olne
can only conclude that, considering the effort devoted to it, the Chinese program was a
failure.'" Id. (quoting Schein, The Chinese Indoctrination Program For Prisoners of
War: A Study of Attempted Brainwashing, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 332
(Maccoby, Newcomb, & Hartly 3d ed. 1958).
141. See Anthony, supra note 138, at 86. As high as 75% in certain groups. Regula-
tion Panel, supra note 138, at 118.
142. See D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra note 17, at 112.
143. Robbins, A Comment On Ash's Conception Of Extremist Cults: With A Post-
script On Models Of Thought Reform, 1 CULTIC STUDIES J. 120, 124 (Fall/Winter 1984).
The only available account that mentions the use of physical restraint is one in which a
disillusioned inductee was prohibited from leaving the cult's compound for a period of
approximately one hour. D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra note 17, at 105-12.
144. D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra note 17, at 105-12.
145. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
[Vol. V
NOTES
of efficiency, they would not want robots or zombies as mem-
bers.146 Such individuals would not possess the enthusiasm and
commitment necessary to fulfill the demands of their group.'
Firsthand observation of cults did not find mindless robots
kept subservient due to inadequate diet.148 Rather, interviews
revealed members of the Unification Church who had entered
and remained for varied reasons and possessed a "high degree of
introspective sensitivity and reflective candor in discussing res-
ervations about [the group]."' 49
The fact remains, however, that mental health professionals
claim, based upon interviews with former cult members, that
brainwashing is a reality in many groups. °50 One possible expla-
nation for the discrepancy of opinion lies in the misinterpreta-
tion of thought reform as brainwashing.'' Cult members do un-
dergo personality change-give up prior commitments, goals and
lifestyles-due to the influence of their respective groups, but
this cannot be mistaken for conversion to unthinking auto-
matons dispossessed of all capacity for reflective thought. 52
Many individuals in our society come under the influence of a
variety of forces of persuasion, such as: the adoption of more
conventional religious doctrines; the entering into convents,
monasteries or seminaries; the adoption of alternate lifestyles
and modes of dress in accord with fad and fashion; and the in-
fluence of public education, mass media, and various forms of
literature.'53 The degree to which these influences are deemed
dangerous is as much based upon an observer's prejudice as it is
upon objective appraisal. 154
Several reasons can be offered to account for former cult
146. D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra note 17, at 109.
147. Id. at 211.
148. Id. at 111. Unannounced visits to group homes found meals to be "nutritious."
149. Id. at 110-11.
150. See, e.g., Singer, Coming Out of Cults, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan., 1979, at 72;
House Report, supra note 87.
151. D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra note 17, at 107-108.
152. Id. at 108-109.
153. See Shapiro, Of Robots, Persons and the Protection of Religious Beliefs, 56 S.
CA. L. REV. 1277, 1290-95 (1983) [hereinafter Shapiro]. See also, S.M. Andersen & P.G.
Zimbardo, On Resisting Social Influence, 1 CULTIC STUDIES J. 196, 197-202 (Fall/Winter
1984).
154. See Panel Discussion: Effects of Cult Membership and Activities, 9 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 91, 105 (1980-81) (comments by Thomas Robbins).
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members' assertions of brainwashing in cults. 155 Included among
them is the desire to spare themselves and their families the em-
barrassment of having to admit the making of a mistake in join-
ing the cult156 or accept blame for the undertaking. 157 Studies
show that only those former cult members who were subjected
to "deprogramming"158 believed they were brainwashed to begin
with.""9 Those who left cults voluntarily maintain that their ini-
tial conversion did not occur against their will. °60 These facts do
not merely indicate that certain cult members were subjected to
brainwashing and others not, but rather that one's conception of
his cult experience is in large part determined by the need to
rationalize membership."'
A court, faced with the accusation that a prospective custo-
dian is the victim of brainwashing and devoid of the capacity to
resist the abusive practices of the cult, must make a painstaking
inquiry into the credibility of testimony as it pertains to the cult
member's capacity for critical reflection. This inquiry is only
necessary, of course, if no substantial evidence exists to buttress
a finding that the parent will engage, or allow others to engage,
0
155. See generally, EDWARDS, CRAZY FOR GOD (1979) (former member of the Unifica-
tion Church discussing his affiliation with the group, including the use of brainwashing).
156. One's ability to proclaim that he was in fact brainwashed effectively relieves the
responsibility for any of his actions in the first place. D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra
note 17, at 201. See also, Robbins supra note 10, at 38.
Robert J. Lifton has himself stated that the "loose usage [of the term brainwashing]
makes the word a rallying point for fear, resentment, urges toward submission, [and]
justification for failure." LIFTON, supra note 130, at 4.
157. D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra note 17, at 201. Anti-cult literature fails to
acknowledge that most cult members join respective groups due to specific personal
needs often manifested as a consequence of disenchantment with conventional society as
they know it, including preexisting familial relationships. Id. at 110; L.B. Sullivan, Coun-
seling And Involvements In New Religious Groups, 1 CULTIC STUDIES J. 178, 187-89
(Fall/Winter 1984).
158. This term refers to the often forcible capture and detention of cult members in
an effort by friends, family, and/or hired deprogrammers to reconvert them to their prior
lifestyle. For a general discussion of this procedure, see T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, LET
OUR CHILDREN Go! (1977).
159. Regulation Panel, supra note 138, at 120.
160. Id.
161. "There are competing versions of a general psychological theory that says
human beings have a need to make their attitudes consistent with their actions ....
[A]ttitudes about these actions are usually formed to explain them in ways that are plau-
sible to the actor-thinker." D.G. BROMLEY & A.D. SHUPE, supra note 17, at 234 n.29 (cit-
ing L.A. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); Bern, Inducing Belief in
False Confessions, 3 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 707 (1977)).
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in abusive practices toward her child. If such evidence does in
fact exist, custody should be denied that prospective custodian
further inquiry notwithstanding. Absent such findings, however,
only in the event that a prospective custodian is wholly lacking
capacity for critical reflection, is a judge justified in denying cus-
tody in the interests of the child's physical or psychological wel-
fare. The finding that a parent is without faculty to think or
reason critically, however, makes speculation into the eventual-
ity of abuse to the child unnecessary. For once it has been estab-
lished that a prospective custodian has been subjected to brain-
washing, thereby manifesting lack of ability to maintain a
meaningful relationship with the child, the court may justifiably
reason that someone other than the parent is controlling the up-
bringing of the child. This determination indicates that the cult-
member parent cannot achieve the role of psychological parent
to his child and justifies denial of custody.' In addition, the
fact that someone other than the parent is responsible for rear-
ing her child indicates that the child will not be confident that
his parent is in control and in charge. This too would justify the
denial of custody. " Of course, any custody order based upon a
prejudicial and, therefore, not factual determination that the
parent is brainwashed and thereby unable to fulfill his proper
role, constitutes a violation of the religious or associational
rights accorded the parent by the first amendment of the
Constitution. 6 "
If there is no credible and substantial evidence to support a
claim of brainwashing, then the parent outside the cult is left
only with the argument that due to the nature of many cults, 6 5
the cult member should be denied custody because harmful
practices may arise in the future, though none may be evident
162. Though no custody decision has yet addressed directly the issue of brain-
washing, courts have determined that the continued presence of a fit parent who through
daily affection, guidance, companionship, and discipline fulfills the child's psychological
and physical needs is crucial to the child's emotional well-being. Jordan v. Jordan, 302
Pa. Super. 421, 425, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (Super. Ct. 1982). In the event a particular
parent is unable to fulfill these needs, custody should be placed with the other parent.
J.E.I. v. L.M.I., 314 S.E.2d 67, 72 (W. Va. 1984).
163. In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio App. 3d 302, 456 N.E.2d 1218 (Ct. App. 1982). See also J.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 98, 116; Musetto, supra note 1, at 436-37, 443.
164. See supra notes 18-20, 24-26, 31-33 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
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during the custody proceeding. This argument must fail, how-
ever, because the court may only base a decision upon firm evi-
dence indicating harm will be visited upon the child. The Con-
stitution demands that in a custody dispute of this nature, there
exists no mere speculation as to impairment of a child's health
and welfare.1 66 This must be the rule, for any custody decision
premised upon speculation and not hard evidence is open to at-
tack on the grounds that it was, in fact, not based upon a genu-
ine concern for the best interest of the child.
No custody decision to date has addressed the issue of
brainwashing. Courts have on occasion, however, grappled with
this perplexing issue in other contexts. In Katz v. Superior
Court,67 the California appeals court was pressed to determine
whether petitioners (specific members of the Unification
Church) had in fact been successfully subjected to brainwashing,
thereby justifying respondents (parents of the respective cult
members) appointment as conservators. 6 8 The court received
into evidence expert testimony as to the mental condition of
each church member viz. alleged infliction of mind control tech-
niques. 1 9 A psychiatrist and clinical psychologist each submit-
ted testimony asserting that each cult member was in fact sub-
jected to "coercive persuasion" similar to that employed against
American prisoners of war during the Korean conflict, 70 and
that each suffered from consequent emotional and cognitive im-
pairment necessitating treatment and appointment of
conservators.17 1
At the same time, however, the court received into evidence
the expert testimony of another psychiatrist who pointed out
that an attempt at "'coercive persuasion' in the absence of
drugs, hypnosis, physical captivity or some greater fear was no
more than speculative theory."' 72 This expert witness also main-
tained that the cult members suffered from no psychological
166. Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. App. 1967).
167. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1976).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 971-80, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 245-50.
170. Id. at 975-77, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 248-9. See supra notes 129, 134-36 and accompa-
nying text.
171. 73 Cal. App. 3d at 975-78, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 248-50.
172. Id. at 979, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 250. See supra notes 138-39, 143-46 and accompany-
ing text.
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pathological condition and directly contradicted the parents' ex-
perts regarding their conclusions as to subjection to coercive
persuasion and the need to appoint conservators."'
In addition, the prospective conservatees offered testimony
of a clinical psychologist who stated that none of the cult mem-
bers psychologically tested exhibited "symptoms similar to those
experienced by prisoners of war who were subjected to similar
tests." This psychologist "expressly repudiated the findings of
the parents' experts . . . and made it clear there was no
emergency. 1174
The court held that the very inquiry into the existence of
brainwashing was in effect questioning the validity of the church
members' faith, and was, therefore, a violation of the petitioners'
first amendment rights and must be abandoned. 175
The disposition of the brainwashing issue in Katz not only
illustrates the conflicting nature of opinion regarding this issue
and the difficulty that is sure to confront a court in its endeavor
to qualify the mental state of a prospective custodian, but also
the care a court must take in addressing concomitant first
amendment freedoms. A court engaged in custody proceedings,
however, must not follow the lead of the California court in Katz
and shy away from engaging in a specific inquiry and determina-
tion as to the mental state of the prospective custodian. This is
so no matter how burdensome such a determination is or how
sacred first amendment rights are deemed to be. A court is con-
stitutionally permitted to, and, indeed, must inquire into reli-
gious and associational practices, such as alleged brainwashing
of members, in order to insure that the physical and psychologi-
cal health and welfare of a child is protected.176
Any discussion of brainwashing in cults must of necessity
address the question whether the children of cults are them-
selves subjected to brainwashing. The currently available litera-
ture and case law concerning cults discloses no express analysis
of this issue. A determination that a child has been brainwashed
173. 73 Cal. App. 3d at 979, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
174. Id. at 980, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
175. Id. at 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256. The court also held that the disposition of the
issue would stand even if the petitioners' organization was of an associational nature. Id.
See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 2, 6, 7, 34-36 and accompanying text.
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must, however, be premised upon the same findings as those re-
quired regarding adult members: that coercive methods 7 " have
been employed to such an extent that all capacity for autono-
mous thought or reflection has been extinguished. It is submit-
ted, however, that a determination of this nature is unnecessary
if not impossible.
The inquiry into the brainwashing of children need not fo-
cus upon the manifestation of complete want of autonomous
thought, 7 s but rather upon the coercive means which must nec-
essarily be invoked in order to realize this end. 79 The utilization
of any one or combination of such means may amount to abuse
in and of itself, thereby mandating placement of a child outside
the cult. This method of inquiry thus short-circuits the ex-
tremely burdensome task of qualifying the mental state of a
child regarding her capacity for critical thought-a task even
more onerous than in the case of an adult due to a child's incom-
plete social and psychological development.
Many children in light of their age simply do not yet possess
significant capacity for autonomous thought regardless of sub-
jection to mind control techniques. Many children, no matter
their age or intelligence, simply do as they are instructed based
upon various sociological reasons. A judicial determination
whether a child is in fact brainwashed is fraught with uncer-
tainty and thereby provides an inadequate basis upon which to
fashion a custody decision. Fortunately, the interests of a child
may be protected through an alternate finding of physically and/
or psychologically harmful cult practices.
VI. CULTS AND CASE LAW
A sampling of case law involving religious groups which may
very well be considered cults 8 ' reveals a strong judicial predis-
position towards protection of members' first amendment rights.
In Burnham v. Burnham,'8' the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska maintained that sufficient evidence indicated: (1) that
177. See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
178. This mental condition may, of course, be considered a threat to the health and
welfare of the child, justifying placement away from a cult member.
179. See supra notes 135-37, 143 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 10, 17, 22.
181. 208 Neb. 498, 304 N.W.2d 58 (1981).
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the cult member would "cut [her child] out of her life if she
disobeys the rules of the Tridentine Church;"' 2 (2) that she
planned to send the child to a church school which engaged in
corporal punishment;' (3) that she believed her child to be ille-
gitimate because she and her husband were not married in the
Tridentine Church;' and (4) that she would separate the child
from her father. 85 The court determined that such a state of
affairs posed a hazard to both the physical and psychological
health and welfare of the child, thereby awarding custody to the
nonmember parent.8 " The Burnham decision vindicated the
best interest of the child by placing her away from the very real
potential for psychological harm and, therefore, justified the ap-
parent imposition upon the first amendment rights of the
noncustodian viz. a custody order founded upon an unfavorable
evaluation of the impact of her religious beliefs upon her
child.18 7
In Harris v. Harris,88 the Supreme Court of Mississippi
held that although the Free Will Holiness Pentecostal Church
believed in snake handling, custody should not be denied the
member parent. The opinion stated that because no substantial
evidence existed indicating that the cult member herself en-
gaged in snake handling nor that the child would be exposed to
the practice, the Constitution guaranteed the member parent's
freedom to attend the church of her choice and raise her child as
she saw fit. 8 ' The court's determination that there existed a
lack of substantial evidence indicating a likelihood of harm to
the child supported the finding that the best interests of the
child were served through the custody order. Moreover, it illus-
trated the court's ability to avoid being swayed by the unortho-
dox beliefs of the cult member in its attempt to delicately bal-
182. Id. at 501, 304 N.W.2d at 61.
183. Id. at 500, 304 N.W.2d at 60.
184. Id. at 501, 304 N.W.2d at 61.
185. Id. at 502, 304 N.W.2d at 62.
186. Id.
187. But see Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May Be Unconstitu-
tional: Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 25,26-30
(1981), in which the author maintains that the court's order in Burnham entailed mere
speculation as to the threat of harm to the child and, therefore, constituted an unconsti-
tutional infringement of the non-custodian's first amendment rights.
188. 343 So. 2d 762 (1977).
189. Id. at 764; see also Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190, 167 P.2d 230 (1961).
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ance her first amendment freedom with a concern for the health
and welfare of the child.
In In re Marriage of Hadeen, 90 the Court of Appeals of
Washington found "substantial evidence to support the finding
that Mrs. Hadeen's first fidelity was to the [First Community
Church of America], even to the extent of rejecting her chil-
dren."'91 There was also evidence that Mrs. Hadeen would com-
pletely separate her children from their father if she were given
custody.'92 In addition, the records indicated that First Commu-
nity Church doctrine prescribed, and Mrs. Hadeen engaged in,
beatings, withholding of food, and forced isolation as discipli-
nary measures designed to combat the children's rebellious be-
havior. 19 Despite these findings and the adoption of the rule
"that the requirement of a reasonable and substantial likelihood
of immediate or future impairment best accommodates the gen-
eral welfare of a child and the free exercise of religion by the
parents," the court remanded the case for a new trial because
the mother's church membership did not "pose a threat to the
mental or physical welfare of the children."' 9 "
The appellate court's decision in Hadeen represents a
troubling scenario: that of a court apparently lax in its duty to
promote the best interest of the children due to an apprehension
toward contravening the free exercise rights of a prospective cus-
todian. 190 Such solicitude, however, may serve to compromise
not only the establishment clause of the first amendment,'96 but
the ultimate concern of all child custody disputes-preservation
of the physical and psychological health and welfare of the
children. e197
190. 27 Wash. App. 566, 619 P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1980).
191. Child Custody, supra note 2, at 1706 n.18 (quoting 27 Wash. App. at 580, 619
P.2d at 382).
192. Id.
193. 27 Wash. App. at 568, 619 P.2d at 375.
194. Child Custody, supra note 2, at 1706 n.18 (quoting 27 Wash. App. at 580-81, 619
P.2d at 382).
195. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. See Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal Rptr. 503, where the facts indicated a likelihood of
psychological harm to a child at the hands of a cult member parent whose beliefs in-
cluded reading only the Bible, dissociation of the child from his father, and casting out
her son in the event he became disobedient; nevertheless, the court of appeals adopted
an "actual impairment" standard and since no physical or psychological damage had yet
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VII. CONCLUSION
Child custody determinations involving a cult-member par-
ent are preeminently difficult because they encompass the ex-
tremely delicate issues of fundamental constitutional rights; rup-
turing the bond between parent and child; protecting the health
and welfare of a child; and, to a rather great extent, an evalua-
tion of cults-a topic that evokes fear and hostility in many.
This note has examined the theoretical and rather convoluted
analysis in which a court must engage in order to accommodate
these various interests. Only one concept emerges as absolute,
however, and that is the need to insure the safety of our chil-
dren. If substantial evidence indicates a likelihood that placing a
child with a particular parent would impair the health and wel-
fare of that child, a court must deny custody to that parent no
matter what additional interests hang in the balance. Such judi-
cial action vindicates the compelling public interest of protecting
the well-being of the child. Though a full understanding of the
cult phenomenon is elusive, many commentators paint a grim
picture. It can only be urged that the judiciary not succumb to
accusations not supported in fact. Though members of certain
cults do exhibit changes of personality and lifestyle,' 98 changes
which may, indeed, justifiably elicit concern on the part of fam-
ily, associates, and society at large, it must be remembered that
"society does not always get the type of person it wants,""'9 and
mere disapproval or prejudice is never a sufficient substitute for
findings of actual danger to a child's safety, nor a sound basis for
a judicial determination to sever the relationship of parent and
child.
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unifica-
tion of opinion achieves only unanimity of the
graveyard. ...
...But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do
not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of free-
become manifest, reversed the trial court, placing the child with the cult-member parent.
Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 513-18.
198. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
199. Shapiro, supra note 153, at 1318.
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dom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to
things that touch the heart of the existing order.2"
Finally, neither may a court be overly solicitous toward a par-
ent's first amendment rights if it is to realize the objective of
socially and constitutionally responsible child placement.
Richard Barnes Montana
200. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).
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